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"....national liberation is necessarily an act of culture."'
Does the Third World exist as a category anymore and if so, does it
make any sense? Where is it located? This essay will attempt a
tentative and speculative exegesis of this question. Even though the
end of the Cold War eliminated the rationale for the Three-Worlds
theory of international order, one continues to hear of invocations of
the category 'Third World'. In order to think through this issue, it is
necessary to consider the various meanings that have been attributed to
this category.
First, Third World was understood as an ideological category,
meaning a collection of States that practiced a certain form of political
engagement with the dominant bipolar bloc politics, mainly through
the form of nonalignment. We can call this the ideological model.
Second, it was understood as a geopolitical concept, indicating specific
areas of the world that were distinguishable from the First World and
the Second World in terms of political and economic organization. We
can call this the geopolitical model. Third, the category Third World
was seen to be defined by a unilinear historical process in so far as it
included those countries which had suffered the experience of
colonialism and imperialism. We can name this the historical
deterministic model. Fourth, the category Third World has also been
used in a popular sense to refer to a certain set of images: of poverty,
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1 AMILCAR CABRAL, NATIONAL LIBERATION AND CULTURE § 6 (1970) (Eduardo Mondlane
Memorial Lecture, Syracuse University, February 20, 1970).1
THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUDIES-1998-99
squalor, corruption, violence, calamities and disasters, irrational local
fundamentalisms, bad smell, garbage, filth, technological
'backwardness' or simply lack of modernity. We can call this the
popular representational model. A common thematic thread that runs
through the first three understandings is that of the idea of nation: that
these national entities had struggled for and achieved political
independence from their colonial rulers. The fourth understanding
would, at first glance, not appear to have any direct connection to this
common theme.
However, I will advance the argument in this essay that the fourth
understanding of impurity, defilement and backwardness of the Third
World is essential, even central, to the other three understandings in
which the narrative of the 'nation' is central. In order to make this
argument I will briefly refer to David Sibley's analysis of Melanie
Klein's psychoanalytical basis for domination and exclusion of the
'Other'. I will further argue that the political praxis and intellectual
exertions of oppositional practices that seek to empower the
disempowered wrongly focus on the idea of the nation, and
consequently on the Third World as a geographical concept. To that
extent, all Third World discourses have been 'national allegories', to
use Frederic Jameson's term.2 I will situate this discussion about the
decentering of the Third World from its geographical space in the
context of two readings: first, Frederic Jameson's Third World
Literature in the Era of Multinational Capitalism3 and second, Aijaz
Ahmad's reply, Jameson's Rhetoric of Otherness and the 'National
Allegory'.4 I will also refer, where relevant, to Ashis Nandy's book,
The Intimate Enemy.5
To the extent that this essay critiques the essentialized manner in
which the term 'Third World' has been received and understood in the
international order, to the extent that it challenges the idea of progress
that is implicit in the ways in which this term has been constructed in
the four models mentioned above, to the extent that it has the objective
Frederic Jameson, Third World Literature in the Era of Multinational Capitalism, 15 SOCIAL TEXT,
Fall 1986, at 65.
3 Id. at 69.
17 SOCIAL TEXT, Fall 1987, at 3.
See ASHis NANDY, THE INTIMATE ENEMY: LOSS AND RECOVERY OF SELF UNDER COLONIALISM
(1983).
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of exposing the myriad ways in which power is exercised by the
dominant groups to the detriment of the disempowered, and to the
extent that it opens up creative possibilities of decentering the category
'Third World' from its geographical moorings, this is an essay on
postmodernism. To the extent that the discussion is rooted in the
historical experience and continuing relevance of colonialism and
imperialism, it is a dialogue between the postmodern and the
postcolonial.
I conclude by arguing that decentering the Third World from its
geography will enable us to focus on the various levels at which power
operates to subjugate us and to engage in oppositional practices that
challenge those power structures and flows. Such oppositional
practices must focus, I suggest, on the contexuality of the struggles,
the local hegemonies that operate to silence the voices of the
subalterns and on the possibilities of building counter-hegemonic
discourses and practices. Here I will briefly refer to Antonio
6Gramsci's notion of hegemony and counter-hegemony.
II. A NOTE ON SOME PRELIMINARY ISSUES RELATING TO
METHODOLOGY
I will start with the observation that the category 'Third World'
continues to be relevant in the post-Cold War era because it clearly
reveals the hierarchical ordering of the international community at
both the statal and non-statal levels; but more importantly, it also
locates the historico-cultural roots of this hierarchical ordering in the
historical experience of colonialism and imperialism. Other terms
such as 'developing' or 'underdeveloped' or 'South', do not capture
these sensibilities fully, even though they are also rooted in the idea
that other cultures must pass through Eurocentric, and historically
linear, paths. As a result, the category 'Third World' continues to be
relevant, particularly as a polemical or counter-hegemonic term that is
6 1 will be primarily referring to ANTONIO GRAMSCI, SELECTIONS FROM THE PRISON NOTEBOOKS
(Quintin Hoare and G.Nowell Smith, eds., 1971).
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designed to rupture received patterns of thinking.7 It is in that sense
that I will approach this category. 8
Now, I would like to briefly discuss the first three models of the
category 'Third World' in terms of the 'national allegory', and
examine the impact this discursive practice has had on international
order. But before entering into that discussion, a few clarifications are
warranted regarding the attitude of most of the Third Worlders towards
postmodernism in general, as this essay also probes, at a more general
level, the relevance of postmodernist themes to the Third World.9 In
my view, the general tendency of the Third Worlders is to imagine
postmodernism as either a peculiarly mutant form of Western
(particularly American) angst that has resulted in the cultural
degeneracy of the West that has little, if any, relevance to the Third
World (the anything-goes critique) or as an ominous successor to the
discourse of modernity (the culture of global capitalism critique).These attitudes are legitimately grounded in certain realities.' 0
First of all, the 'death of the subject' proclaimed by postmodernism
strikes many in the Third World, who have seen the fruits of their
struggle for national identity culminate in political independence, as
simply naYve, false or rather dangerous. National identity was a
powerful mobilizing force against colonialism and certainly resulted in
very substantial victories for colonized peoples. They also see much
of their post-independence struggles, such as women's movements, as
rooted in certain identities that need united fronts which are
undermined by the critique that postmodernism brings. While I fully
agree with this sensibility, postmodernism's critique of the subject
appears to have value, as part of a common struggle against the
totalizing tendencies of Eurocentric production of knowledge, at two
7 Frantz Fanon's influence must be obvious, See FRANTz FANON, THE WRETCHED OF THE EARTH
(1963).
'Lest it be misunderstood, let me clarify that it is not my suggestion that the category 'Third World'
is to be seen in a binary relation with the category 'West' in order to give meaning to its counter-
hegemonic nature. On the contrary, - as it will become clear later in this article - 'Third World' occupies
a space of its own that it constantly fights to preserve and reclaim.
9 These and the following comments are based upon a simultaneous reading of academic texts that
debate the relationship between postmodemism and postcolonialism, as well as conversations with other
Third World scholars and activists. For a sampling of the former, see the writings collected in THE POST-
COLONIAL STUDIES READER 117-47 (Bill Ashcroft, Gareth Griffiths and Helen Tiffin eds., 1995),
10 The following discussion is based on JANE FLAX, THINKING FRAGMENTS: PSYCHOANALYSIS,
FEMINISM AND POSTMODERNISM IN THE CONTEMPORARY WEST (1990) and FEMINIST CONTENTIONS
(Seyla Benhabib, Judith Butler, Drucilla Cornell and Nancy Fraser, eds., 1995).
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levels at least. First, to the extent that this critique challenges the
unitary conception of the subject and places it in contingent,
historically changing and culturally variable sociopolitical and cultural
linguistic and discursive practices, the Third Worlders locate the
subject in the colonial context and assert that the universal subject of
reason can only be understood in terms of the concrete political
contestations of the colonial encounter. In fact, this is one of the
central arguments of many of the postcolonial writers, such as Dipesh
Chakrabarty"l and Gayatri Spivak.12 In international relations, this
may have the salutary effect of critically interrogating the formation of
new subjects - such as NGOs or civil society - and thus prevent them
from being applied in an essentialized manner.
Second, the critique of the subject also makes political sense as
part of a wider project of assault on Western forms of domination,
conducted at the intellectual level, that comes in as a useful ally in a
common struggle. One can also note in passing, that even vehement
anti-essentialist critiques of the postmodern persuasion - such as Judith
Butler13 ("strategic Fprovisionality")- and the postcolonial stripe - such
as Gayatri Spivak' ("a strategic use of positivist essentialism in a
scrupulously visible political interest") - have recognized the strategic
use of essentialism under continuously contested circumstances.
The second problem that Third Worlders have with postmodernism
is in its insistence on the 'death of history'. Taken literally, this could
imply the prima facie rejection of any macro historical narrative and
thereby, the denial of any connection between historical memory and
political objectives. In fact, the negation of history makes struggle
meaningless and mobilization impossible. Given the West's
deplorable record in erasing and denying the histories of the colonial
1 See, e.g., Dipesh Chakrabarty, Postcoloniality and the Artifice of History: Who Speaks for
"Indian" Pasts?, REPRESENTATIONS, Winter 1992, at 32.
12 THE POST-COLONIAL STUDIES READER, supra note 9. For an elaboration of the method by which
this is accomplished, see Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, Subaltern Studies: Deconstructing Historiography,
in SELECrED SUBALTERN STUDIES (Ranajit Guha and Cayatri Chakravorty Spivak, eds., 1988).
13 See Judith Butler in FEMINIST CONTENTIONS, supra note 9.
14 With specific reference to the Third World, Gayatri Spivak points out: "If the 'third world' is used
as a mobilizing slogan for the developing nations, that's fine, but that is rather different from essentialism.
That is in response to specific policies of exploitation. In the arenas where this language is seriously used,
each country comes asserting its difference. They really do know it's strategic. That is a strategy that
changes moment to moment, and they in fact come asserting their differences as they use the mobilized
unity to do some specific thing." OUTSIDE IN THE TEACHING MACHINE 13 (1993).
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peoples, this issue raises sinister suspicions among the Third Worlders.
Some notorious examples come to mind: Hegel claming that Africa
has no history' 5 and Marx's attitude towards British colonialism in
India ("whatever may have been the crime of England she was the
unconscious tool of history"). 16  However, my inclination is to
understand this issue as merely the death of the meta-narratives of the
unilinear histories of civilization, progress and development, a
circumstance that makes alternative subaltern histories possible. This
would then mean only the end of all grand narratives and would open
up the possibility of building little histories of subjugated and
disempowered peoples such as women, minorities, the poor, the
colonized and others. 17 It should be noted that this is also what the
postcolonial writers such as Ranajit Guha call for. 18
The third problem that Third Worlders have with postmodernism
has to do with its essentially European or transatlantic cultural and
geographical location and the resultant centrality that such a
perspective accords to the European in history and in the construction
of knowledge. In many ways, such centrality of location is seen as a
mere continuation of the imperial process of Eurocentrism. As David
Slater has pointed out in a recent study of the history of theoretical
discourse on international questions, "the tendency to erase theory
from the history of the non-West can be seen as a pivotal strategy in
the West's construction of an international division of intellectual
labor, and the turn towards a global agenda has been marked by a
continued reflection of the same construction". 19 Even the isolated
legal academics who study or teach 'Law and Postmodernism' in the
United States, reveal very little familiarity with any writers from the
Third World, including the postcolonial writers such as Guha or
Spivak. None of the postmoderns such as Baudrillard, Lyotard and
even Jameson are principally concerned with issues of domination and
"5 See G.W.F. HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 99 (J. Sibree, trans. 1956).
16 See Karl Marx, The British Rule in India in KARL MARX AND F. ENGELS, ARTICLES ON BRITAIN
166-72 (1971).
17 These 'little histories' or what George Rude calls 'history from below', have indeed been written
by post-colonial, neo-marxist and cultural revivalist scholars long before the advent of post-modernism.
18 See Ranajit Guha, On Some Aspects of the Historiography of Colonial India, in SELECTED
SUBALTERN STUDIES, supra note 12, at 37-45.
19 See David Slater. Contesting Occidental Visions of the Global: The Geopolitics of Theory and
North-South Relations, 4 BEYOND LAW - MAS ALLA DEL DERECHO 97, 113 (1994).
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exclusion of the Third World Other, though Jameson is clearly a
Marxist who labels postmodemism "the cultural logic of late
capitalism".
I am very sympathetic to this criticism, particularly from a
sociology of knowledge perspective, and I would suggest that this
problem results from the inability of the postmodems to come to terms
with or recognize the internal dimensions of colonialism: that is, the
extent to which colonial ideas and practices have, in an ironic return of
compliment, affected the societies of the colonizers themselves.
20
Given the fact that modem European culture, with its notions of
progress, order and civilization, has developed in direct response to the
expansion of European imperial power during the colonial encounter
(as argued by many including Edward Said 1), any attempt by the
postmodems to engage the cultural determinants of hegemonic
practices must start by locating itself in the colonial and neocolonial
context; in other words, to transcend domesticity in the scope of its
critique. Therefore, I would suggest that the postmodems have much
to learn from postcolonial and neomarxist theory. Without taking
colonialism and its effects seriously, the postmodern project
degenerates into an intellectual style without ethical content.
So it would seem that the sense of discomfort of the Third
Worlders with postmodemism is, while serious, not fatal. Following
Anthony Appiah, I would suggest that maybe we must strive to
recover the postcolonial writers' humanism within postmodernism,
while still rejecting the master narratives of modernism.22 It is in that
spirit that I would offer the following part of the essay. I will start by
examining the psycho-political construction of the category 'Third
World' during the historical process of colonialism and imperialism.
III. DAVID SIBLEY AND THE PSYCHO-POLITICS OF THE UNCLEAN
My examination of the psycho-political roots of the
representational model of the Third World is an attempt to show that
20 For a detailed discussion of this idea, see Ashis Nandy, supra note 5; HOMI BHABHA, THE
LOCATION OF CULTURE (1994).
21 See EDWARD SAID, CULTURE AND IMPERIALISM (1993).
2 See Kwame Anthony Appiah, The Postcoonial and the Postmadern. in THE POST-COLONIAL
STUDIES READER, supra note 9, at 123.
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the category 'Third World' has been constructed as the uncivilized,
deviant 'Other' by the European and the Third World elites together,
during and after the colonial encounter that makes its embrace of the
'national allegory', and therefore of geography, rather essential. My
discussion in this section relies primarily on David Sibley's
Geographies of Exclusion.23
David Sibley discusses the problem of exclusion by describing the
role of space in the reproduction of social relations; that is, he shows
how many forms of economic and political
alienation/domination/exclusion are actually rooted in and constituted
by notions about space, about the environment. Central to this
endeavor, according to him, is the "construction of the self, the way in
which individual identity relates to social, cultural and spatial
contexts". 24 This self is constituted from infancy through a continuous
process of projection (the capacity to attribute feelings to other people)
and introjection (additions to the personality that comes from the
situations that a child lives through), both of which result in building a
sense of border, a sense of selfhood and a sense of the social. 25 This
sense of border is initially manifested, for example, in a distaste for
bodily residues. As a result, his conclusion is that the self is a cultural
production in which the boundary between the inner (pure) self and the
outer (defiled) self acquires a cultural significance. This results in the
peculiarly Western puritanical obsession with order and cleanliness
and a detestation of bodily wastes, dirt, soil, ugliness, and so on. At a
societal level, this sense of border in the infant is the basis for the
construction of and distancing from the 'Other'. This 'Other' is not
only the 'Other' of the colonial encounter, but also the 'Other' of
gender, as the mother can not experience the sense of autonomy that
this sense of the self grants due to her oneness with the baby in 'dirty'
tasks like nappy changing.
Ashis Nandy has drawn attention to the important parallel between
the development of colonialism and the development of the modem
23 See DAVID SIBLEY, GEOGRAPHIES OF EXCLUSION: SOCIETY AND DIFFERENCE IN THE WEST
(1995, particularly chapters I, 2, 4 and 6.
Id. at 3.
25 This part of David Sibley's discussion relates to Melanie Klein's work. For other works by
Melanie Klein, see OUR ADULT WORLD: AND OTHER ESSAYS (1963). THE SELECTED MELANIE KLEIN
(1987).
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concept of childhood in the seventeenth century. 26  As he puts it,
before, the child was seen as a smaller version of the adult; now the
child became an inferior version of the adult which had to be educated
and developed into a responsible and mature adult. It now became the
responsibility of the adult to 'save' the child from "a state of
unrepentant, reprobate sinfulness through proper socialization, and
help the child grow towards a Calvinist ideal of adulthood and
maturity". 27 Colonialism picked up on these ideas and drew a new
parallel between primitivism and childhood, wherein the colonized
were often portrayed as minors.
Similarly, Anthony Anghie has recently written about the
formulation of basic doctrines of sovereignty by Francisco Vitoria in
the seventeenth century, during the colonial encounter between the
Spanish and the Indians.28 As described by him, the Indians were seen
as child-like and inferior versions of the Spanish by Vitoria, who had
to be redeemed and civilized. This imagery of the Indians as minors,
was central to the formulation of basic doctrines of sovereignty and
intervention and their violent application to colonized peoples during
the subsequent centuries by naturalists and positivists. It is instructive
to read his analysis with Nandy's analysis of childhood and
primitivism in the colonial encounter and compare it to the following
account by David Sibley.
David Sibley proceeds from the above discussion of the boundary
of the self and the construction of the 'Other' to discuss the
construction of the uncivilized 'Other' in the colonial encounter. In
fact this understanding of the self was the basis for judging cultural
difference. He observes, "the expansion of European empires and the
development of the capitalist world economy required fitting
dependent territories and dependent peoples into the cosmic order of
the dominant powers" that led, on a global scale, to a spatial and
cultural boundary between civilization and various uncivilized, deviant
26 See Ashis Nandy, supra note 5, at 14-15. See also Ashis Nandy, Reconstructing Childhood. in
TRADITIONS, TYRANNY AND UTOPIAS: ESSAYS IN THE POLITICS OF AWARENESS (1987).
27 Id.
28 See Anthony Anghie. Francisco de Vitoria and the Colonial Origins of International Law, 5
SOCIAL & LEGAL STUD. 321 (1996).
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'Others'. 29  Thus, the edge of civilization was marked by the presence
of grotesque people, who were imperfect, physically deformed, and/or
black and at one with nature. This 'edge' was not a mere spatial
metaphor, but was developed into a physical boundary that made it
clear that the civilized stayed within the safe confines of the European
center while the uncivilized and the grotesque stayed at the periphery.
The spatial images created, and the cultural differences
emphasized, by this boundary have been at the core of the modem
international order. They are reflected in notions about development
and progress in general and in various doctrinal forms in the
international legal order at a more particular level, such as 'just war'
and 'humanitarian intervention' doctrines. 30
The Third World elites who came to power after political
independence did not challenge the colonial origins of these notions of
development and progress. 3' Instead, they adopted them towards their
own peoples. Why did they do it? It was due to an uncritical and
emphatic faith in the emancipatory idea of the nation, understood as
the State. To them, the project of nation-building meant the
establishment of many of the same values that the colonialists had
2 It must be noted that this imagery is not peculiar to Western imperialism alone; other imperialisms
share it. The Chinese 'culture', to take one example is built on the difference between the civilized
Chinese in the Middle Kingdom and the barbarians surrounding it. The discussion focuses on the
European example due to the historical experience of Western colonialism and the continuing experience
of neocolonialism especially in the context of global capitalism.
30 Indeed, it could be argued that the entire edifice of international law is constructed upon the
physicalization of the spatial images created by the politics of cultural difference. The very concept of a
nation-state as a bounded entity, distinguishing between 'us' and 'them' and enabling the legitimate
deployment of coercive power to maintain those boundaries, as well the principles of non-intervention and
domestic jurisdiction, are paradigmatically rooted in this politics of cultural difference. That is, however,
a large project that needs to be dealt with elsewhere. I should note that recent international legal
scholarship, under the umbrella of 'New Approaches to International Law', has begun moving in that
direction. See, e.g., Anthony Anghie, Creating The Nation-State: Colonialism and the Making of
International Law (Unpublished SJD Dissertation, Harvard Law School, 1995); Annelise Riles, Aspiration
and Control: International Legal Rhetoric and the Essentialization of Culture, 106 HARV. L. REV. 723
(1993). A bibliography of the recent scholarship, compiled by Professor David Kennedy, is available at
Harvard Law School.
31 For an incisive critique, see Dianne Otto, Subalternity and International Law: The Problems of
Global Community and the Incommensurability of Difference, 5 SOCIAL & LEGAL STUD. 337 (1996). 1
would distinguish this from the rather intense attempt made by Third World elites to attribute the
'backwardness' of their economies to neocolonialism. While the latter strategy created waves in the
1960s and 70s, particularly in the form of the New International Economic Order claims that were based
on the ideas developed by dependency theorists from Latin America, it was still caught up within the
teleological confines of the ideas of development and progress. Indeed, the central objective of these
critiques was to progress as quickly as possible so that the Third World could 'catch up' with the West.
This is entirely different from a critique that refuses to accept the very ideas of progress and development.
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relied upon to establish and consolidate their rule - values such as
progress (measured by industrialization), order (measured by the
exclusion of social undesirables such as prostitutes, working class,
poor, and so on) and cleanliness (measured by the exclusion of poor,
slums and other 'eyesores'). Urban planning in particular, was
extensively used - and continues to be used - for removal of slums in
'beautification campaigns'; the most notorious examples that come to
mind are the Marcos regime's forced eviction of the poor from the
slums in Manila during the 1970s, and Sanjay Gandhi's clean-Delhi
drive against the poor and slum-dwellers during the 1975-77
Emergency period in India. These neocolonial elites have failed to
realize that the effort to banish the 'grotesque' to the periphery is a
mere continuation of the colonial project.
Finally, a word must be added about the role of the international
media, which is mostly Western-dominated, in reinforcing the
stereotypical images of the Third World: of poverty, squalor, dirt,
chaos, and violence. These images correspond to the 'grotesque-in-
the-periphery' imagery referred to above. The continuing salience of
the representational model of the category 'Third World' critically
depends on this negative stereotyping by the international media and
reflects the neocolonialism of multinational capital that drives this
media business.
To conclude this section, the representational model of the
category 'Third World' is firmly rooted in the spatial geography of
difference. Locating the Third World in its geography is central to the
colonial and the neocolonial project of judging and excluding the
cultural 'Other'.
IV. FREDERIC JAMESON'S 'NATIONAL ALLEGORY' AND AIJAZ
AHMAD'S 'CIVILIZATIONAL OTHER'
In his essay, Jameson argues for rethinking the humanities
curriculum of the Western academia to include Third World literary
texts.32 He rests this argument on what he sees as the epistemological
priority of the allegorical vision of the Third World texts, most of
which, according to him, collapse the distinction between the private
32 See Jameson, supra note 2.
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and the public, between the poetic and the political33; in other words,
the 'telling of the individual story' and experience ultimately involves
the "whole laborious telling of the experience of the collectivity
itself'. 34 In that sense, all Third World texts are to be read as 'national
allegories'. 35  This, he contrasts with one of the determinants of
capitalist culture, that is, 'the culture of the Western realist and
modernist novel' which always involves a radical split between "the
private and the public, between the poetic and the political, between
what we have come to think of as the domain of sexuality and the
unconscious and that of the public world of classes, of the economic,
and of secular political power: in other words, Freud versus Marx". 36
He adds that it is precisely this very different relation of the personal
to the political that makes the Third World texts so alien to the West.37
He gives two illustrations of this from the Third World: the Chinese
author Lu Xun's The Diary of a Mad Man (1918) and the Senegalese
author Ousmane Sembene's novel Xala (1973). 38
Jameson's 'national allegory' analysis is built, on a certain
understanding of the 'Third World' that is rooted in the historical
deterministic model discussed above in the introduction. That is, he
defines 'Third World' exclusively in terms of its 'experience of
colonialism and imperialism' while the First World and the Second
World are defined in terms of modes of production, namely capitalism
and socialism.
Aijaz Ahmad takes Jameson to task on precisely this issue. He
argues that since Jameson defines the category 'Third World' solely in
terms of its experience of colonialism and imperialism, the political
category that necessarily follows from this exclusive emphasis is that
of the 'nation', with nationalism as the peculiarly valorized ideology 39;
and that it is precisely because of this privileging of nationalistic
ideology that Jameson is able to argue that "all Third World texts
are... national allegories". 40 This emphasis on the nationalist ideology
" Id. at 69.
34 Id. at 85-86.




39 See Aijaz Ahmad, supra note 4. at 5.
40 Id. at 5-6.
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leads Jameson, he suggests, to argue that the only 'choice' for the
Third World is between 'nationalism' and 'global American
postmodernist culture' .41 He criticizes Jameson for positing a
totalizing binary opposition of nationalism/postmodernism which has
no basis in reality. In fact, many of the bourgeois nationalisms of the
Third World have no problems with global American postmodemism;
they deeply desire it.42 Indeed, Ahmad sees a 'very tight fit' between
the Three Worlds theory, the over-valorization of the nationalist
ideology and the assertion that all Third World texts are national
allegories.43 This mode of argument has two dangers, according to
him: first, to say that all Third World texts are this or that is to say that
all other texts that are not this or that, are not 'true' narratives.
44
Second, this exclusive focus on the 'national' denies the possibility
that there are other motivating forces for history such as the struggles
based on class, gender, race, region, and so on and that narratives that
are rooted in those struggles will be denied their authenticity.
45
Ahmad also finds it particularly problematic that the historical
deterministic model of the 'Third World' relied on by Jameson defines
it purely in terms of an externally inserted phenomenon, namely
colonialism and imperialism, while the First and Second Worlds are
defined in terms of their modes of production: "a classification that
divides the world between those who make history and those who are
mere objects of it".4 This ignores several realities and is built on
neocolonialist assumptions that have to be challenged. First, within
the Third World (in Jameson's sense) there are countries such as the
East Asian Tiger economies of Singapore and others, or even India
that resemble the First World in many ways. India, for example, has
an economy that is twice the size of the gross industrial product of
Britain, has more than twice the number of technical personnel of
France and Germany combined and has had longer bourgeois
democratic Parliamentary tradition than Spain or Portugal. Where
then does one locate such countries? In the absence of an empirical




41 Id. at 89.
46 Id. at 7.
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basis, what then is the politics of locating countries across a spectrum
of differences?
Second, the historical deterministic model of the category 'Third
World' rests, according to Jameson, on the idea that the modes of
production in the Third World are either primitive (African) or Asiatic
(India and China).47 We have seen that empirically they are not, that
many countries in the Third World do not fall into one category or the
other and have both First and Second Worlds within themselves. But
there is a deeper problem of cultural evaluation - and therefore the
construction of the 'Other' - here; it ignores the hierarchical and linear
relationship between these modes of production and the Western ones
of capitalism and socialism. For example, Ashis Nandy has shown
that Marx's theory of progress that conceptualized a movement from
prehistory to history and from infantile or low-level communism to
adult communism, and his theory of the Asiatic mode of production,
,48rest on a certain racist imagery of the Asian 'Other'.
Third, the historical deterministic model of the Third World relied
upon by Jameson also ignores the reverse effects of colonialism.
Ahmad points out that the unity of the public and private, so
characteristic of the (pre-industrial) Third World, has occurred in the
First World as well: Thomas Pynchon's Gravity's Rainbow (1973) or
Ralph Ellison's Invisible Man (1952) are examples of this effect.49
Conversely, the separation between the public and the private,
characteristic of capitalism, has occurred in the Third World as well,
precisely because of the effect of colonialism and imperialism and the
penetration of capital into the Third World. Ashis Nandy also shows
how colonialism has produced cultural and psychological pathologies
in the colonizing societies as well. 50
Finally, Ahmad points out that much of the Third World literature
is actually not exclusively about the experience of colonialism and
imperialism, but also about class structure, familial ideologies, the
management of bodies and sexualities, and so on.5' The criminality of
the colonizer was a concern, but it certainly came later than, and was a
47 See Jameson, supra note 2, at 68.
4 See Nandy, supra note 5, at 13.
49 See Ahmad, supra note 4, at 15.
" See Nandy, supra note 5, at 30-32.
51 See Ahmad, supra note 4, at 2 1.
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competitor to, brutalities of the indigenous oppressors. To take only
the most obvious example, the oppression of women in India predates
colonialism and can not certainly be narrated as an 'experience of
colonialism and imperialism' alone. This leads him to conclude that
there is no such thing as a Third World literature that can be
constructed as an internally coherent object of theoretical knowledge. 52
By analogy, I have argued that there is no such thing as the Third
World, that can be understood solely in terms of a singular
determinant, namely, the political geography of ex-colonial
nationalism. Now let me turn to a discussion of the three models of
the category 'Third World' in the light of the above issues.
V. THREE MODELS OF THE 'THIRD WORLD' AND THE 'NATIONAL
ALLEGORY'
Returning to the first three nation-based models of the category
'Third World', I start with the ideological model, the one that defines
the category by its neutralist political engagement through
nonalignment with the bipolar model of bloc politics. It is a fairly trite
fact that European domination of the world through colonialism had
assumed the form of the supremacy of the Great Powers from 1945
onwards. As many commentators have argued, this shift merely
changed the form of European hegemony, not its substance. 53 As a
result, the general understanding among scholars is that this fact
accounts for the response from the Third World in the form of
nonalignment and that as a result, the Third World truly tried to break
down this binary form of world politics. The Bandung Conference 54 is
often cited as a historical moment when this political realignment was
wrought globally. However, closer attention to the micropolitics of the
Bandung Conference may reveal that, at least for the leading
personalities of the Conference including Jawaharlal Nehru and Zhou
En-Lai, many complex political considerations, including domestic,
52 Id. at 4.
53 See, e.g., MOHAMMED BEDJAOUI, TOWARDS A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER (1979).
5 The Bandung Conference brought together 29 Afro-Asian nations, in a show of Third World
solidarity, with the apparent purpose of forging the basic principles of non-alignment as a viable third
option in international politics. On Bandung conference, see CAROLOS ROMULO, THE MEANING OF
BANDUNG (1956); A. APPADORAI, THE BANDUNG CONFERENCE (1955); RICHARD WRIGHT, THE COLOR
CURTAIN (1956).
THIRD WORLD LEGAL STUDIES-1998-99
may have been more predominant than a common global urge to create
a Third Front.55
While subsequent historical development has shown that the
nonalignment model of politics failed during the Cold War period, the
reasons for such failure have not been carefully analyzed. This
analysis is essential for arguing that the Third World must be
decentered from its geographical moorings, that is, from its 'national
allegory'.
I would venture to suggest that the failure was rooted in two
internal contradictions: first, the Third World countries were
dedicated, at the level of domestic political and economic
organization, to the pursuit of either the (American) capitalist model or
the (Soviet) communist/socialist model, without realizing that the
pursuit of nonalignment at the international level could only succeed if
they devised a real alternative to both of those dominant Eurocentric
forms of government and economy domestically; in other words,
external neutrality presupposed the availability of an internal choice
that would not implicate the foreign policy interests of both the Great
Powers. This the Third World did not attempt to do, as it remained
mired in the Eurocentrism of both these meta-narratives of capitalism
and communism/socialism both of which shared much common
ground in their Eurocentrism, models of rationality, and the relation
between man (sic) and nature. It made nonalignment a rather artificial
political stance. Also, the state-centeredness of the discourses
emanating from both polarities also suited the tendencies of the elites
who came to power, most of whom were Western-trained.
I suggest that the Third World failed to develop an internal
alternative because the elites who came to power in most of the Third
World countries, after independence, shared the belief with the Great
Powers that they had to follow the West in a linear historical path that
placed a premium on the mobilizing and central power of the
'nation'. 56 A classic example was Jawaharlal Nehru. This 'national
allegory' was a central theme of the political imagination of the
" I am not elaborating on this issue here except to note that scholars have already begun examining
this. See AuAz AHMAD, IN THEORY: CLASSES, NATIONS, UTERATURES, chapter 8 (1992).
6 This is a familiar argument. See e.g., PARTHA CHATrERJEE, THE NATION AND ITS FRAGMENTS:
COLONIAL AND POSTCOLONIAL HISTORIES (1993).
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progressive anti-colonial elite during this period, and all subsequent
interpretations of that period, including by some of the most astute.5
The second internal contradiction that ensured the failure of the
nonalignment model of politics is that it defined its own identity only
in relaton to the binary of East versus West and thereby affirmed the
centrality of these European/transatlantic categories. In other words, it
defined itself as the decolonized 'Other', 58 by positioning itself in
oppositional terms to the European discourses. This had the effect of
rendering it as the object of history, a geographical lump that was ripe
for ideological contestation between two European/American powers
precisely because it defined itself an ideological terra nullius.
As a result, the ideological model of the Third World was built on
the twin pillars of the imagery of the nation and the totalizing binary of
First World/Second World. It enabled the Third World to attempt to
submerge regional and local complexities and postpone consideration
of issues under the rubric of solidarity of the nonaligned. After the end
of the Cold War, these complexities have suddenly started to become
more visible, in the form of local nationalisms and ethnic rivalries,
though they are hardly new.
The second model of the category 'Third World', the geopolitical
one, defined the category in terms of difference in the forms of
political and economic organization. This model was based on a linear
understanding of history, by a hierarchical ordering of modes of
production and political organization. Thus, the 'Asiatic' and
'primitive' modes of production were seen as the initial phases in the
evolution of capitalism and communism, as seen in the past section,
while liberal market democracy modeled on the rich industrial
countries was touted as the final form of human evolution, as Francis
Fukuyama has argued.59 This linear view of history, which provided
the driving force behind the colonial discourse of civilization and
progress, was merely continued under the different name of
'development' during the neocolonial period after independence.
"According to Aijaz Ahmad, even Edward Said interprets the spirit of Bandung by focusing on how
the new Orient had armed itself with nationalism. The question, however, is: whose nationalism are we
talking about? See Aijaz Ahmad, supra note 55, at 291.
s I rely on Edward Said's insights here. See EDWARD SAID. ORIENTALISM (1978).
See FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992).
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For the elites who came to power in the Third World after political
independence, this view of history was central to the 'nation-building'
project, so that they could 'catch-up' with the West. This was the
governing logic behind the whole idea of the New International
Economic Order (NIEO), which focused on reducing the income gap
between the North and the South. Indeed, to this day, the spatial
relationship between the North and the South is caught up in this
teleological narrative. Any social facts that did not fit into the pattern
of this narrative - such as the East Asian miracle of the 1970s and
1980s - was sought to be explained away through a Weberian
framework that stressed the cultural determinants of those social facts
and implied, therefore, the essential irreproducibility of those social
facts elsewhere. In other words, the framework for interpreting the
relationship between different communities and peoples had to be
grounded either in an ahistorical teleological narrative or in an
essentialized melange of 'values' that contrasted the exotic 'Other'
with the West.
The institutional basis for this framework was the nation-state.
This is the main reason why the General Assembly Resolutions
dealing with the NIEO in the 1970s began by stressing the sovereignty
and independence of states and the primacy of the state in the
development process. Indeed, this primacy was even emphasized in
counter-sovereignty discourses such as human rights, where the state
was recognized as having the primary responsibility to promote and
protect the human rights of its citizens. In sum, the geopolitical model
of the 'Third World' is central to the dominant discourse of
development which is a 'national allegory'. In addition, the
geopolitical model and the linear view of history that it rests on, also
construct an image of the Third World as imperfect, squalid and so on,
that needs to be revealed, remedied or renounced through appropriate
'technical' interventions.
60
The third model of the category 'Third World' is the historical
deterministic one, in that it is defined by the singular historical
experience of colonialism and imperialism. My discussion of Jameson
60 base these comments on a rich and growing literature, which I would loosely term, 'Critical
Development Theory'. See, e.g., DEVELOPMENT DICTIONARY: A GuIDE TO KNOWLEDGE AS POWER
(Wolfgang Sachs, ed., 1992); POST-DEVELOPMENT READER (Majid Rahnema & Victoria Bawtree, eds.,
1997).
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and Ahmad brings out the various aspects of this model in great detail
and shows how such an understanding inevitably leads to the
construction of all Third World narratives as 'national allegories'. So I
will not expand on it except to indicate that my purpose is not to deny
the importance of the historical experience of colonialism and
imperialism; on the contrary, it affirms it. My argument is only that
such historical experience does not need to privilege the 'national'
narrative over the others, because it has the effect of sweeping other
forms of local oppressions and struggles under the carpet. This is
nowhere more true than in the field of international relations, where
the continuing centrality of the nation-state has rendered all Third
World narratives as essentially 'national allegories' that do not allow
political space for other emancipatory narratives. It may then be the
case that to capture a distinctive 'Third World' voice that has any
relevance for constructive oppositional politics, we may need to
critically reinterrogate the radical voices of the past, including non-
Western, women, indigenous and other voices of the ordinary people
which are silenced by law's traditional narrations.
VI. CONCLUSION: RETHINKING THE MEANING OF THE 'THIRD
WORLD'
Let me conclude on a constructive note: is there a way to
reimagine the category 'Third World' in such a way that it remains
alive to its historical roots of colonialism and imperialism, while, at
the same time, resisting the totalizing tendencies of the 'national
allegory'? I believe that it can be done. The category 'Third World'
can and should be decentered from its geographical moorings of the
'nation' for the reasons outlined in the previous sections and should be
reimagined as a counter-hegemonic discursive tool that allows us to
interrogate and contest the various ways in which power is used. Here
I rely on Antonio Gramsci's notion of counter hegemony.
Gramsci defines hegemony as the process which generates "the
'spontaneous' consent given by the great mass of the population to the
general direction imposed on social life by the dominant fundamental
group (historical bloc)". 6 1 Hegemony to him, then, is an active process
61 See Antonio Gramsci, supra note 6, at 12.
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involving the production, reproduction and mobilization of popular
consent, which can be constructed by any 'historical bloc' that takes
hold of it and uses it. Of course, being a Marxist, he favors the
working class to do this, but there is no reason why this analysis can
not be extended to any oppressed group.
His notion of counter-hegemony, on the other hand, is not a pure
oppositional project that seeks to overthrow everything that is in place.
As he puts it, "it is not a question of introducing from scratch a
scientific form of thought into everyone's individual life, but of
renovating and making 'critical' an already existing activity".62 Thus
the emphasis is on putting into place discourses which, while building
on the hegemonic discourses, transcend them by introducing new
elements through a critical interrogation of the ways in which the
hegemonic project succeeds and fails.
Viewing the category 'Third World' as a counter-hegemonic
discursive practice liberates it from its geographical 'national'
moorings while at the same time insisting on the hegemonic power
formation of the colonial encounter. The emphasis henceforth, would
be on the actual terrain that power operates on, rather than some
predetermined given one such as the 'nation'. That would enable us to
focus on issues of class, gender, sexuality, region, language and so on,
which have been submerged by the totalizing power of the 'national
allegory'. We could then interrogate the contextuality of the local
struggles, and the differences in the experience of local oppressions,
that are hidden from view.
This would have fundamental implications for the way in which
international order is imagined. For a start, this would compel the
dominant discourse to rethink the relationship between the local and
the global. If Third World is not defined by political geography, but
by the actual contestation of power formations such as gender
oppression, it is possible to think of transnational linkages among the
oppressed. One would then have to map the world by a cultural
geography which denies the category of the civilizational 'Other'.
62 Quoted in J. LARRAIN, MARXISM AND IDEOLOGY 84 (1983).
